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This study is an account of the modern presidency as a source––and under Donald Trump, an 
accelerant––of systemic problems in American politics. Against the prevailing scholarly view of the 
Trump presidency as an unqualified aberration, I argue that the signal features of his efforts at 
governance are actually the product of converging patterns of political and institutional order. 
Building on seminal (but previously disjointed) work on ascriptive Americanism and the rhetorical 
presidency, I show that Trump represents the political synthesis of America’s ascriptive tradition and 
a form of presidential leadership inaugurated more than a century ago by Woodrow Wilson. 
Moreover, I argue that Trump’s fusion of these two predominating forces in the polity has 
innovated the uses of presidential demagoguery, and in turn exacerbated pre-existing dilemmas of 
governance. Examining the key aspects of that convergence not only underscores the pitfalls of 
Wilson’s leadership doctrine manifest in Trump’s case, but also marks these as accelerants of a 
deeper problem––a process I call constitutional decay. By rethinking the relationship between 
Trump as an agent of ascriptive nationalism, and the pathologies built into the modern presidency, I 
ultimately show how independent patterns of continuity taken for granted in American politics can 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The prevailing scholarly view of Donald Trump’s presidency is that it represents either an 
aberration in presidential politics, an autocratic threat to the polity, or both.3 Yet the Trump regime’s 
defining features––the primacy of popular rhetoric and ascriptive nationalism––each have independent 
sets of antecedents that must be accounted for if we are to say clearly what is novel or routine about 
the administration. Exchanging contemporary histrionics for a wider historical lens, this thesis makes 
the case that this presidency’s signal features actually issue from sources that recast Trump not as an 
outlier, but as the outgrowth of converging patterns of political order in American political development.  
As a political actor who won elective office in an upset, Trump has been the beneficiary of the 
forms of historical continuity I interpret in this study. But at a deeper level, his approach to governing 
constitutes the political synthesis of them: Trump has fused a century-old mode of presidential 
leadership stripped to its core logic––Woodrow Wilson’s “rhetorical presidency”––with an illiberal 
political tradition that predates the constitutional founding.4 He has, in his own way, sublimated the 
ideology of ascriptive nationalism and the leadership doctrine that made the modern presidency. By 
reinterpreting earlier scholarship on the presidency and the ascriptive tradition by Jeffrey Tulis and 
Rogers Smith, I try to show how the systemic effects of this sublimation mark the modern presidency 
 
3     See e.g., Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth-century (London: Bodley Head, 2017); Jeffrey K. Tulis  
and James Russell Muirhead, “Will the Election of 2020 Be the End or a New Beginning?”, Polity (forthcoming); Rogers M. Smith 
“Lockean Liberalism and American Constitutionalism in the Twenty-First Century: The Declaration of Independence or 
“America First”? in, American Political Thought: A Journal of Ideas, Institutions, and Culture, Vol. 8 (Spring 2019); Alyson Cole and 
George Shulman, “Donald Trump, the TV Show: Michael Rogin Redux,” Theory & Event 21, no. 2 (2018): 336-357; William E. 
Connolly, Aspirational Fascism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2018); Stephen Collinson, “Trump’s Authoritarian 
Streak,” CNN. October 12, 2017; Stephen M. Walt, “Top 10 Signs of Creeping Authoritarianism, Revisited,” Foreign Policy. July 27, 
2017; David Frum, “How to Build an Autocracy,” The Atlantic. March 08, 2017; E. J. Dionne, Norman J. Ornstein, and Thomas 
E. Mann, One Nation After Trump: A Guide for the Perplexed, the Disillusioned, the Desperate, and the Not-yet Deported (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2017). Cole and Shulman’s treatment of Michael Rogin’s marriage of the symbolic and material in American 
political history is superb. My thanks to Prof. Cole for pointing me towards Rogin’s relevance to contemporary politics. 
4     Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), hereafter cited as “Tulis (1987)”; idem., 
The Rhetorical Presidency, Princeton Classics ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017); Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting 
Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); idem., “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: 
The Multiple Traditions in America,” American Political Science Review (1993) 87, no. 3: 549–66. 
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itself as a source––and in Trump’s case, an accelerant––of constitutional decay.5 
The first chapter foregrounds the political logic built into Wilson’s rhetorical presidency to 
show how naturally traditional ascriptive appeals map onto that logic. Exploring that underlying 
theoretical harmony, I argue that Wilson’s failure to distinguish demagoguery from his conception of 
presidential leadership––a kind of messianic quest to divine national “purpose” through popular 
rhetoric––reveals their common “structural” core. By drawing out that underlying commonality in 
examples of Trump’s rhetoric and policy, we see the central role demagoguery plays in the synthesis of 
the long-standing patterns I identify. Illuminating the mechanics of that process evidences the 
remarkable extent to which Wilson’s efforts to redefine the purpose of the presidency in the 
constitutional order actually remade the institution into a source of political pathology.  
The second chapter and conclusion explore why the converging patterns of order visible in 
Trump’s case matter for governance today. Analyzing several pre-existing systemic dilemmas debated 
by political scientists––what I call the “failure” of separation of powers and “governance by 
campaign”––I argue that Trump’s ascriptive demagoguery exacerbates the process of constitutional 
decay in important ways. The specific dilemmas I bring into view, building on Tulis’s earlier work, are 
elaborated as symptomatic of that process. I develop the concept of decay––instead of regime 
“breakdown” or democratic “decline”––because the account of contemporary politics I draw from 
Trump’s case isn’t a tale of political apocalypse, or the imposition of tyranny by an “imperial” 
president.6 It is instead a diagnostic story about how features of constitutional design built into 
American politics at the moment of its genesis have been transformed––by concrete developments––
into the sources of systemic problems. The presidency is only one, but perhaps the most salient, of 
those sources.  
 
5      I detail the origins of the concept of constitutional decay, and how I apply and develop it here, in Chapter Two. 
6    See, e.g., ibid., Snyder (2017). On the brilliant work that first used this phrase, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial 
Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1973). 
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Finally, although I find serious normative and practical problems in Trump’s case, it should 
ultimately be understood not as a singular threat to the constitutional order, but a testament to how 
patterns of continuity taken for granted in American politics can come together in subtle ways that 
alter systemic conditions. In other words, I try to show how Trump’s approach to governing is not 
merely the negotiation of a partisan landscape, as all presidencies are by definition, but also an 
influence on the political system itself in light of its infirmities.7 The marriage of the modern 
presidency and ascriptive nationalism Trump has engineered using demagoguery––and the converging 
background conditions that made that synthesis possible––are thus a window onto the broader 
dilemmas he exacerbates.  
  
 
7     On debates about earlier versus more recent presidents, as well as periodization schemes and the problems germane to 
studying the office, see Jeffrey K. Tulis, “The President in the Political System––In Neustadt’s Shadow,” in Presidential Power, ed. 
Martha Kumar, Robert Shapiro, and Lawrence Jacobs (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 265-73; and “On the Politics 
Skowronek Makes,” Journal of Policy History 8 (1196) 2: 248–49. On the possibilities and constraints common to all presidencies by 
virtue of the office’s peculiarly disruptive nature––the best theory of presidential history to date-–see Stephen Skowronek, The 
Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003). Cf. 
Terri Bimes and Stephen Skowronek, “Woodrow Wilson’s Critique of Popular Leadership: Reassessing the Modern-Traditional 
Divide in Presidential History.” Polity 29, no. 1 (1996): 27-63. Bimes and Skowronek pose brilliant and challenging questions to 
Tulis’s project, and hence, to the parts of Wilson’s thought I emphasize in this study. But they also get Andrew Jackson’s case of 
popular leadership (and Tulis’s reading of it) totally wrong, and overlook Wilson’s enduring influence as I hope to indicate below.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
Rethinking the Trump Presidency 
 
…he can speak what no man else knows, the common meaning of the common voice. 
- Woodrow Wilson, 1909 
 
The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency 
The first of these converging patterns is the collection of rhetorical and governance practices 
that have come to define the presidency in the modern era––what students of the office, following 
Jeffrey Tulis, collectively call the rhetorical presidency.8 Inaugurated in the early twentieth-century by 
Theodore Roosevelt, Tulis shows, that set of practices was transformed into a full-fledged doctrine of 
presidential leadership under Woodrow Wilson.9 Documenting those developments, Tulis 
demonstrates how the disarmingly familiar features of the presidency traceable to Wilson––the 
president as policy leader, partisan-in-chief, and popular orator––were actually striking departures from 
a form of political orthodoxy that dated back to the founding. “Today it is taken for granted,” Tulis 
writes, “that presidents have a duty constantly to defend themselves publicly, to promote policy 
initiatives nationwide, and to inspirit the population. And for many, this presidential ‘function’ is not 
one duty among many, but rather the heart of the presidency––its essential task.” Those touchstones 
of contemporary governance, it turns out, were actually twentieth-century “inventions” and 
“discoveries.” The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century polity “proscribed the rhetorical presidency as 
ardently as we prescribe it.”10 
Before the rise of Wilson’s “New Way,” presidents largely communicated through formal 
writing, seldom gave “popular” speeches, and almost never deployed direct appeals to “the people” at 
 
8     Ibid., Tulis (1987); James W. Ceaser, Glen E. Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis, and Joseph M. Bessette, “The Rise of the Rhetorical 
Presidency,” in Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 2, “Presidential Power and Democratic Constraints: A Prospective and 
Retrospective Analysis” (Spring, 1981), 158-171. 
9       Ibid., Tulis (1987). Cf. Skowronek and Bimes (1996). 
10      Ibid., Tulis, intro., 4-5, 62-87, 95, 97, 110, 120-121, 137.  
  5 
large to advance specific partisan policies.11 The reason for that communicational restraint was the 
influence of “a common stock of political opinion and a family of rhetorical practices that constituted 
a doctrine”––what Tulis calls “the Old Way.” 12 This set of leadership norms was conceived by the 
founders as a kind of cultural corollary to the larger political architecture erected with the 1787 
Constitution.13 Tulis identifies several signal concerns that shaped the new regime’s defining features––
republicanism, executive independence, and the separation of powers for instance––but one of the 
overarching themes of political debate throughout the ratification period was the problem of 
“demagoguery.”14  
Understood as the form of popular appeal directed at collective “passions,” the founders’ basic 
argument was that the Constitution’s institutional arrangements, because they were designed in 
accordance with the “republican principle,” could actually mitigate the tendency toward demagoguery 
visible in earlier democracies.15 Particular demagogues might be of the “hard” or “soft” variety, Tulis 
explains––either flattering or inflaming indignation in one or more of the polity’s groups––but their 
appeals are not native to the political left or right as such.16 At base, the “key characteristic of 
demagoguery seems to be an excess of passionate appeals”: the hard demagogue envisioned by the 
framers “create[s] or encourage[s] divisions among the people in order to build and maintain his 
 
11      Ibid., 45-62. See also Tulis (2017) at 205. 
12      Ibid., Tulis (1987), 25-31. 
13      Ibid., 29, n6. 
14     Ibid. Indeed, as Tulis points out, the collection of essays that would become the Federalist actually starts and ends with the 
issue of demagoguery. See Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist. ed. by Charles R. Kesler. (New York: 
Signet Classics, 2005), nos. 1 and 85. 
15    Ibid., Tulis (1987), 27-30. Ibid., Federalist, No. 71. Hamilton writes: “When occasions present themselves, in which the 
interests of the people are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be the 
guardians of those interests, to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and 
sedate reflection. Instances might be cited in which a conduct of this kind has saved the people from very fatal consequences of 
their own mistakes…” 
16     Tulis observes: “Since most speech contains a mix of rational and passionate appeals, it is difficult to specify demagoguery 
with precision…But…we cannot ignore the phenomenon just because it is difficult to define.” See idem., 28-29. 
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constituency. Typically, this sort of appeal employs extremist rhetoric that ministers to fear.”17  
In a new edition of The Rhetorical Presidency, Tulis elaborates that real demagogues “meet” four 
rules: “(1) They fashion themselves as a man or woman of the common people, as opposed to the 
elites; (2) that their politics depends on a powerful, visceral connection with the people that 
dramatically transcends ordinary political popularity; (3) that they manipulate this connection, and the 
raging popularity it affords, for their own benefit and ambition; and (4) that they threaten or outright 
break established rules of conduct, institutions, and even the law.”18  
Surveying discussions of the dilemmas inherent to executive power from the founding 
juncture, Tulis shows how seriously the framers took the threat of demagogues in the new polity.19 
Beyond the “indirect” institutional means thought suited to preventing or constraining demagoguery 
(e.g., the Madisonian iteration of separation of powers), the Old Way’s rhetorical standards for 
presidential leadership underscore their collective wariness.20 Tulis finds two principal nineteenth-
century “prescriptions” for presidential speech, each of which is defined by rhetoric’s intended 
audience, content, and form. The first of these measures was that presidential “policy rhetoric” should 
be written, and although publicly available and consumed, “addressed principally” to Congress on the 
assumption that doing so would productively structure legislative deliberation.21 Because this form of 
communication was shaped by an intended audience of national lawmakers, it was thought capable of 
“elevating” and instructing national discourse, instead of merely responding to or attempting to 
manipulate public opinion. “To the extent that people read these speeches”––and they did, Tulis tells 
 
17      Ibid. 
18    Ibid., 30; ibid., Tulis (2017), 204 (quoting Michael Singer’s distillation of James Cooper’s earlier account). See generally 
Michael Signer, Demagogue: The Fight to Save Democracy From Its Worst Enemies (New York: St. Martin’s, 2009), 35; and James 
Fenimore Cooper, The American Democrat (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics, 1931 reprint; orig. publ. 1838), 120.  
19      Ibid., Tulis (1987), 30, n9. 
20      Ibid., 29-30. 
21      Ibid. 
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us––“they would be called upon to raise their understanding to the level of deliberative speech.”22  
The second prescription was that genres of popular presidential speeches directed at the 
“people at large”––the inaugural address, for instance––would mirror the president’s written messages 
to Congress in their content and tone. Although orally delivered, these would remain consistent with 
the “constitutional tradition” of formal interbranch communication.23 Prior to the twentieth-century, 
Tulis shows, these speeches “emphasized popular instruction in constitutional principle” (e.g., 
republicanism) and the broad “tenor and direction of presidential policy”––but they overwhelmingly 
avoided “discussion of the merits of particular policy proposals” thought better suited for 
congressional partisans and public debate.24 Each of these customs was political orthodoxy not merely 
for formality’s sake, but because constitutional formality reflected the founders’ view that popular leaders 
were basically synonymous with demagogues.25  
Thus, in Tulis’s telling, by constitutional design presidents were meant to be “freed from the 
need to consult the people continually,” but were “judged by them periodically” in adherence to 
constitutional provisions (e.g., formal addresses and regular elections). They were thought 
institutionally “independent enough to be forceful and preeminent in matters of command,” and an 
“unequal” but active “partner in the deliberative process.” Embedded in an institutional matrix of 
offices defined by “structures and practices” that made demagoguery “unlikely and unprofitable,” he 
illustrates, presidents had a host of robust constitutional powers and duties; but all shared a political 
allergy to demagogic appeals inculcated by the combination of constitutional form and custom.26 
 
22      Ibid., 46. 
23     Ibid., 133-35. See also Jeffrey K. Tulis. “On Congress and Constitutional Responsibility,” in the Boston University Law Review, 
Vol. 89 (2008): 516; Jeffrey K. Tulis, “Deliberation Between Institutions,” in Debating Deliberative Democracy (James S. Fishkin & 
Peter Laslett eds., 2003), 200, 206. 
24     Ibid., 47. The Constitution “contains this principle [of prescribed presidential speech] in two of its provisions” designed to 
induce deliberation and inhibit demagoguery: Article I, Section 7, which establishes the requirements for a president’s veto 
message; and Article II, Section 3, which details the State of the Union procedures. 
25      Ibid., 45-47. 
26      Ibid. 
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Tulis excavates numerous examples of the “effect of doctrine as constraint” on nineteenth-
century presidential behavior, but his discussions of Andrew Jackson are especially instructive.27 One 
controversy in particular, the 1832 Nullification Crisis, might have invited occasion for passionate 
presidential appeals in response to the national economic strife and political divisions roiling partisans 
of that era.28 But despite Jackson’s reputation for popular leadership (as well as outright demagoguery), 
Tulis explains, “this ‘popular leader’ had to forego politics…when he went on tour.”29 “Jackson’s 
disposition was unlike that of [his predecessor John Quincy] Adams. He liked popular speaking and 
did much of it before becoming president.” Yet Jackson’s “most famous communication to the 
people”––the Nullification Proclamation––saw its content and tone considerably “constrained” by the 
written form prescribed in the founding doctrine. The “blatant appeal to passion” for which Jackson’s 
“oratorical abilities were reputedly well suited” are largely absent in the long train of legal arguments 
and intricate appeals to constitutional principle that make up that document.30  
 
Wilsonian Leadership as Interpretation 
Tulis marks Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency as the transition between the Old Way and 
Wilson’s modern leadership dispensation.31 Elected in 1901, Roosevelt employed popular forms of 
presidential speech, “inspirational rhetoric,” that plainly flew in the face of the reigning nineteenth-
 
27    Ibid., 5, n3, 74-75, n19. 
28    Ibid., 53, 79, n34. 
29    Ibid., 74-75. 
30   Ibid., 53. Consider a more dramatic illustration of the founding doctrine’s sway on presidential behavior: On the eve of the 
Civil War, a crowd gathered around president-elect Abraham Lincoln’s train at a stop in route to his inauguration. In response to 
spectators soliciting his views on the impending crisis, Tulis explains, Lincoln actually made spontaneous arguments about the 
inappropriateness of speaking to the subject as president, which would have been tantamount to reaffirming his election as 
primarily a partisan victory. Lincoln instead reiterated that “he could not discuss the issues of the day extemporaneously”––even 
under the extraordinary circumstances of  southern secession––and that “they would have to await a ‘proper’ occasion.” 
Strikingly, Tulis explains, Lincoln’s rebuffs garnered outbreaks of applause and cheers from the crowd. See idem., 5, n3. For the 
text of Andrew Jackson’s Proclamation see: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jack01.asp. 
31    Ibid., 135. 
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century customs. But in a case study of TR’s rhetorical campaign for passage of the Hepburn Act––a 
massive effort to regulate railroad monopolies and avert what looked like imminent class warfare––
Tulis shows Roosevelt’s departure from founding norms to be a self-conscious, temporary, aberration 
designed to contend with a national crisis.32 Roosevelt, in Tulis’s telling, violated the founders’ 
rhetorical standards in order to better accomplish their underlying goals of proscribing fundamental 
“regime-level” questions purportedly settled by the Constitution’s ratification.33  
Having written and thought extensively about the threat of demagoguery, Roosevelt framed his 
passionate appeals as momentary necessities for restoring “normal” politics in a polity marred by class 
conflict and roiled by “true” demagogues like Illinois’s John Peter Altgeld.34 Tulis explains:  
Roosevelt concluded that his public philosophy must distinguish individuals and corporations 
from the classes or categories in which they were subsumed. He would go after bad individuals 
and evil corporations, but…would chastise as demagogues those who opposed wealth as such 
or the impoverished as such….If popular rhetoric was proscribed in the nineteenth-century 
because it could manifest demagoguery, impede deliberation, and subvert the routines of 
republican governance, it could be defended by showing itself necessary to contend with these 
very same political difficulties…Roosevelt’s presidency constituted a middle way between…the 
preceding-century and the rhetorical presidency that was to follow.35 
 
Elected in 1913, Woodrow Wilson brought to the presidency a detailed theory of leadership 
designed to justify and regularize the forms of popular rhetoric Roosevelt hoped would be temporary. 
In Tulis’s telling, Wilson saw the complicated institutional arrangements and overall structural features 
of the 1787 Constitution as the central “defect” of American politics.36 Although he would eventually 
 
32     Ibid., 112-115, 135. 
33    The outbreak of the Civil War and the economic turmoil of the Gilded Age are only the most obvious examples of the fact 
that Hamilton’s envisaged “politics of administration” has been periodically challenged by regime-level questions (e.g., “who rules, 
and via what forms?”) prior to TR’s presidency. Roosevelt’s case, in other words, is only one instance of the periodic resurgence 
of national debates over questions thought to be proscribed by liberalism’s foundational focus on rights and constitutional forms, 
including the overall viability of the political system itself. See Tulis’s discussion on the founders’ attempts to permanently 
preclude those questions in national politics via the “architectonic act of regime founding,” and other means, in ibid., 30-31. 
34     Ibid., 112, n26. 
35     Ibid., 95, 97-115. 
36    Ibid., 120-121, n.3-5. See generally Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics (1884; reprint ed. 
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abandon reform ideas tied to constitutional amendment, Wilson’s core critique of the founders’ polity 
remained functionalist: a sluggish legislative process, a fragmented state, corrupt party machines, and a 
lack of unified leadership at the national level were all traceable to the separation of powers 
architecture. In Wilson’s mind, the framers mistakenly employed “Newtonian” assumptions, following 
Montesquieu, in adopting “mechanical” principles of constitutional design, when in reality 
government was inherently “Darwinian.”37 Modern constitutional forms, Wilson thought, were the 
cumulative but dynamic products of political life’s ceaseless flux––products of organic political 
development and adaptation. Government was “not a machine but a living thing”:  
It [government] falls, not under the theory of the universe, but under the theory of organic life. 
It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton…The makers of our federal Constitution followed 
the scheme as they found it expounded in Montesquieu, followed it with genuine scientific 
enthusiasm…Politics is turned into mechanics under [Montesquieu’s] touch…[But] No living 
thing can have it organs offset against each other as checks and live…its life is dependent upon 
their quick cooperation, their ready response to the commands of instinct or intelligence, their 
amicable community of purpose…Living political constitutions must be Darwinian in 
structure and practice.38 
 
Tulis shows how Wilson ultimately identified the presidency as the best vehicle for 
constitutional innovation––a remedy for the polity’s systemic ills he thought germane to the founders’ 
“Newtonian” design.39 Put simply, the new leadership standards Wilson labored to normalize as 
president reversed the constitutive ideas in that design, rejecting the founders’ reasoning about 
deliberation and demagoguery.40 Presidential rhetoric in the new formulation would routinely advocate 
for specific policies, equate those policies to “major contests” of principle––instead of debates over 
the technical merits of policy––and most important, would be “spoken and addressed principally to the 
 
Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1973), 141, 149, 164, 195; and Constitutional Government in the United States (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1908), 56. 
37      Ibid., Wilson, quoted in ibid., Tulis (1987). 
38      Ibid. 
39      Ibid., Tulis, (1987). 
40      Ibid., 62-87, 97, 110, 120-121, 137. 
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people at large.” Seeking to diminish the importance of written communications that maintained 
nineteenth-century forms and content, Wilson displaced the Old Way’s prescription for a formal, 
deliberative, tone in popular presidential speeches with rhetoric “shaped” by the perceived demands of 
the People as its principal audience.41 That project, Tulis illustrates, amounted to a fundamental 
redefinition of the president’s purpose in the political order.42 At the heart of that revised purpose is 
Wilson’s conception of leadership––and the critical function a leader’s words play in a process he called 
“interpretation.”43 
Wilson urged that presidents derived their authority directly from the people as a whole––not 
the constitutional law––and that a true “leader’s rhetoric could translate the people’s felt desires into 
public policy.” It was the leader’s task to “sift through the multifarious currents of opinion to find a 
core of issues that he believed reflected majority will even if the majority was not fully aware of it.”44 
The president as leader-interpreter would “explain the people’s true desires [or needs] to them” in a 
manner that was both “easily comprehended and convincing,” and render a nation’s inchoate or latent 
longings to its citizens coherently and routinely, not just during national crises.45 This quasi-messianic 
role, in Wilson’s telling, was only suited to the category of man that seeks “to read the destiny in affairs 
for others as well as for himself, for a nation as well as for individuals.”46 In line with that belief, Tulis 
explains, Wilson “pressed for more ‘visionary’ speech” that would “articulate a picture of the future 
and impel a populace toward it. Rather than appealing to, and reinvigorating established principles, this 
forward-looking speech taps the public’s feelings and articulates its wishes…it creates, rather than 
 
41      Ibid., 134-36. 
42      Ibid, 132.  
43      Ibid., 128-32. 
44      Ibid. 
45      Ibid., 129. 
46    Michael Rogin, Ronald Reagan: The Movie and Other Episodes in Political Demonology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), 93-95. Rogin’s account of demonology in American politics is authoritative, and today, perhaps more relevant than ever. 
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explains, principles.”47  
Wilson also believed that the redefinition of presidential leadership as interpretation was 
applicable to his own political career, and to the demands of his own time. As Michael Rogin has 
observed, “As he approached and occupied the White House,” Wilson’s “organic metaphors” went 
beyond earlier concerns about constitutional dysfunction and reform to the de facto marriage of 
presidential leadership and the nation’s destiny in his rhetoric.48 In various speeches and discussions of 
Abraham Lincoln––Wilson’s interpretive exemplar––we glimpse his self-conception as “the 
embodiment of the people as a whole,” a leader who can “speak what no man else knows”:  
When I speak the ideal purposes of history I know that I am speaking the voice of America, 
because I have saturated myself since I was a boy in the records of that spirit…When I read my 
own heart…I feel confident it is a sample American heart…whatever strength I have, and 
whatever authority, I possess only so long and so far as I express the spirit and purpose of the American 
people…A nation is led by a man who…speaks, not the rumors of the street, but a new principle 
for a new age; a man in whose ears the voices of the nation do not sound like the accidental 
and discordant notes that come from the voice of a mob, but concurrent and 
concordant…voices of a chorus, whose many meanings, spoken by melodious tongues, unite in 
his understanding in a single meaning and reveal to him a single vision, so that he can speak what no 
man else knows, the common meaning of the common voice…We know our task to be no 
mere task of politics but a task which shall search us through and through, whether we be able 
to understand our time and the need of our people, whether we be indeed their spokesmen and 
interpreters, whether we have the pure heart to comprehend and the rectified will to choose our 
high course of action.49 
 
In Wilson’s view, only an unmediated connection between the people and a presidential “spokesman” 
can indicate the imperatives of executive leadership––only that embodied relation, “a pure heart,” can 
signify which exercises of executive power, which national course, is appropriate at any given juncture. 
The definitional features of presidential “power”––a president’s “authority” or “strength” in Wilson’s 
 
47      Ibid., Tulis (1987), 135. 
48      Ibid., Rogin, 94, n39-42. 
49      Ibid., Wilson, quoted in Rogin. See also Woodrow Wilson, address at Sioux Falls, South Dakota. September 8th, 1919; idem., 
address at Saint Paul, Minnesota. September 9th, 1919. See ibid., Tulis, 136-137, n33-34, 145-160. See also Woodrow Wilson, 
“Abraham Lincoln: A Man of the People,” in Baker and Dodd., ed., College and State, 2:94-95. My emphasis. 
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formulation––have no basis in law (e.g., in Article II), but derive exclusively from the extent to which a 
president expresses “the spirit and purpose of the American people” as she alone “comprehends” it. 
 Tulis correctly notes that Wilson’s critique of the Old Way and its corresponding remedy never 
supplies a satisfactory method for distinguishing between a benevolent popular leader and a 
demagogue.50 Although he struggled to make that distinction intelligible in his writings on leadership, 
Wilson never did so, as he himself acknowledged.51 Channeling Lincoln’s reasoning from the (1838) 
Lyceum Address, Wilson once wrote that “some man with eloquent tongue could put this whole 
country into a flame…What an opportunity for some man without conscience to spring up and say: 
‘This is the way. Follow me’––and lead in the paths of destruction!”52 At base, Tulis shows, the only 
safeguard against presidential demagoguery in Wilson’s new model is his belief that the people 
themselves would be able to tell between a malevolent demagogue and a true leader-interpreter.53 
It should be underscored that in Tulis’s account, Wilson’s critique of the founding architecture 
had merit on one score and oversights on another. The New Way’s legitimation of routine popular 
appeals responded to a real “constitutional deficiency” that was especially visible in Roosevelt’s case: 
the founders’ Constitution actually “promised” more governing capacity to presidents than it delivered 
in practice.54 As a form of prerogative intrinsic to executive power, popular rhetorical leadership might 
very well be necessary––despite its attendant risks––if presidents need it to meet genuine national 
crises.55 Yet on other features of regime design, especially separation of powers, Tulis shows that 
Wilson’s understanding was simply flawed. “The accuracy of Wilson’s portrayal of the founders,” he 
explains, “may be questioned. He reasoned backward from the malfunctioning system as he found it to 
 
50     Ibid., Tulis (1987), 131-132. See also ibid., Wilson (1898), 143-147. 
51     Ibid., Tulis, 130, 131, n25. 
52     Ibid., Rogin, 93, n35. 
53     Ibid., Tulis, (1987), 130-132. 
54    Ibid., 7-8, n7-8. Interview with Jeffrey Tulis. “Jeffrey Tulis on ‘The Rhetorical Presidency’ on Steroids.” Podcast audio. The 
Lawfare Podcast. The Lawfare Institute and the Brookings Institution. Saturday January 26th, 2019. 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/jeffrey-tulis-rhetorical-presidency-steroids. 
55     Ibid., Tulis (1987), 202. See especially Tulis’s discussion of prerogative. 
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how they must have intended it…[But] If Wilson’s argument regarding demagoguery was strained or 
inadequate, it was a price he was willing to pay to remedy what he regarded as the founders’ inadequate 
provision for an energetic executive.”56  
What Tulis does not explore in-depth, however, is the extent to which Wilson’s idealized 
leader-interpreter is––at bottom––theoretically indistinguishable from the variety of demagogue feared 
by Roosevelt and the founders. What Wilson sought to cover over in his discussions of leadership is 
precisely this built-in tendency to political pathology: the fact that a hypothetical presidential 
demagogue would prosecute a species of interpretation by definition. Like the benevolent leader-
interpreter, presumably, the passionate appeals of the demagogue would also purport “to understand 
our time and the need of our people,” to discern in the polity “a single meaning,” and to “reveal” and 
articulate “a single vision”––all under the benign auspices of “the common meaning of the common 
voice.”57 The only difference being that instead of divining and instructing an underlying “majority 
will,” the demagogic interpreter would merely use impassioned “visionary speech” to divide the 
populace and embolden a loyal faction repackaged as “the people” writ large.58 Wilson’s inability to 
distinguish clearly between a leader-interpreter and a demagogue evidences that the underlying logic of 
the rhetorical presidency can function as defining features of each.  
At an empirical level, because the leader’s imperative to divine “a new principle for a new age” 
is what actually undergirds national policy debates in Wilson’s account, interpreters must recast the 
messy democratic process itself as high “contests of principle” instead of mere technical disputes 
 
56      Ibid., Tulis, 95. Tulis shows that Wilson did take the threat of demagoguery seriously, despite his ultimate conclusions about 
its (un)likelihood in the presidency. See idem., 4-5, 62-87, 97, 110, 120-121, 130-132, 137. 
57       Ibid., Wilson, “Abraham Lincoln: A Man of the People,” 94-95. Quoted in ibid., Tulis (1987) 134-136. 
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followers––a subset of the American people as a whole that he invests with the authority of the whole People. Trump then uses 
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authority, the Constitution.” See generally, ibid., (2017). 
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driven by legislative deliberation and elite bargaining. In effect, the content of presidential speech in 
this view––in addition to being popular, partisan, and policy specific––must be conceived as a medium 
for the deeper, quasi-oracular, task of interpretation. Simply put, Wilson’s doctrine logically requires 
the use of whatever rhetorical content is perceived necessary to meeting that task. Presidential leadership 
as interpretation becomes not only the ideal method, but the basic mission, of governance itself. The 
risk that “some man with eloquent tongue could put this whole country into a flame,” to use Wilson’s 
phrase, is simply factored into that messianic quest to divine national “purpose.”59 
* * * * 
The features of Wilson’s project I have sketched have become entrenched aspects of the 
institution across the last century.60 But beyond documenting that pattern, perhaps the most profound 
insight The Rhetorical Presidency offers is Tulis’s account of the long-term systemic effects engendered by 
those transformations. The most important of these is what he calls the permanent “ambivalence” of 
the office in today’s constitutional order.61 Tulis uses the metaphor of a “layered constitutional order” 
to explain this developmental picture: Wilson’s doctrine––his own idealized “constitution”––was 
foisted “over top” the founding architecture, but without replacing the governing structures and 
customs he sought to displace through popular leadership.62 Wilson’s efforts, Tulis shows, “proceeded 
through reinterpretation of the Constitution rather than by replacement, or even significant amendment, 
of its structural principles.”63 
This reality meant that Wilson, although successful in “alter[ing] elite and public 
understanding” of the ends and means of presidential leadership, did not erase the political “logic that 
 
59      Ibid., Wilson, quoted in Rogin 94, n39. 
60      Ibid., Tulis (1987), 145-189. 
61      Ibid. See generally, ch.6, 161-205, and the afterword to the new edition (2017). 
62      Ibid., Tulis (1987), 7-8, n6, 161. 
63      Ibid., 146. My emphasis. 
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informed the original Constitution.”64 Hence, presidents today inhabit “an office structured by two 
systemic theories”––they are “caught between two layers of systemic thought, the product of a political 
hybrid.”65 Recent presidents especially, Tulis demonstrates––from both Bushes, to Bill Clinton and 
Barack Obama––have increasingly struggled to “negotiate the dilemmas of the rhetorical presidency as 
they are pulled and hauled between the old Constitution and the new…[They] instinctively…try to 
appropriate the most useful aspects of each constitutional dispensation.”66 Ultimately, he argues, all are 
“schooled by both constitutions,” even if they “only consciously understand the second.”67 Rhetorical 
leadership on policy conceived in Wilsonian terms thus becomes, for every modern president, the sine 
qua non of leadership as such; but in practice, the old standards persist and subvert the new. 
 
The Ascriptive Tradition in American Politics 
Nested within these modern practices and conditions is the political logic inherent to Wilson’s 
leadership doctrine. That logic, I have argued, is at bottom theoretically synonymous with 
demagoguery––even if, as Tulis argues, extant elements of the Old Way have restricted presidents to 
the occasional demagogic appeal since Wilson.68 But to see the full realization, and deeper meaning, of 
the rhetorical presidency’s pathological tendency is to understand Donald Trump’s fusion of its core 
logic to the demands of racial order germane to the ideology of ascriptive nationalism.  
Turning to this second pattern of order evident in Trump’s case, consider the signal rhetorical 
and policy themes indicative of that synthesis: race, immigration, and anti-globalism. These themes and 
their policy corollaries occupy a very traditional place in the history of America’s constitutive political 
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traditions.69 Rogers Smith’s (1997) study of American citizenship laws, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of 
Citizenship in U.S. History, marshalled two centuries worth of evidence to convey just how prominent a 
part ascriptive Americanism has played in that story.70 
Smith’s overarching contention was that American political culture should be understood, 
fundamentally, “as the often conflictual and contradictory product” of deeply linked “multiple political 
traditions”––not as an expression of  a singular “hegemonic liberal or democratic tradition.”71 Smith 
shows how America’s core traditions––“liberalism,” “republicanism,” and “ascriptive Americanism”––
are recurrent sets of ideas that simultaneously define, and order, social and economic institutions. They 
also seek to determine which Americans are “eligible to participate in them”––assigning the “roles or 
rights” to which people are entitled by virtue of membership in (or exclusion from) the polity.72 In this 
way, political traditions and the sorts of citizenship laws they construct reflect the deep networks of 
meaning assembled in a political culture, as much as they formally distribute “political powers” 
between members of the community.73 Citizenship laws, in this more sophisticated empirical view, are 
much more than taken for granted amalgams of formal rights: they are the “most fundamental of 
political creations.”74 
Civic Ideals also overturned a profoundly influential set of premises about American politics that 
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date back to Tocqueville: namely, that the U.S. could only be described as a paradigmatically “liberal 
democratic” society––one whose distinctive developmental trajectory was “shaped most by the 
comparatively free and equal conditions” and “Enlightenment ideals” that supposedly “prevailed” at 
the founding.75  Smith illustrates that the Tocquevillian thesis failed “to give due weight to inegalitarian 
ideologies and conditions that have shaped the participants and the substance of American politics just as 
deeply” as America’s liberal, democratic, or republican principles. Far from being “destined to 
marginality by their lack of rational defenses,” Americans’ illiberal and inegalitarian “beliefs and 
practices” have sustained multiform hierarchies based on ascribed qualities like race, ethnicity, gender, 
religion, and class.76 Distilled to its essence by Stephen A. Douglas and “attributed to the Constitution” 
by Roger Taney in the 1857 Dred Scott case, ascriptive nationalism’s central racialized tenet is that the 
American polity was “made by the white man, for the benefit of the white man, to be administered by 
white men’” (preferably of an Anglo-Saxon, Protestant background).77 
By tracing the imperatives of “nation-building” across the whole of American history, Smith 
illustrates how struggles over civic ideology have induced political leaders of the left and right––and of 
both parties––to instrumentalize “aspects of all three of these heterogeneous traditions” in their 
rhetoric and policy according to political expediency.78 In the earliest, and probably most wide-ranging 
instance, Smith shows how an emergent “proto-nationalist” identity forged amid the revolutionary zeal 
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of the 1770s ensured that the roles of women were defined by patriarchal rule, and that the subhuman 
statuses of enslaved (and free) blacks and Native Americans were made absolute in Thomas Paine’s 
America.79 Civic reforms in the wake of the Constitution’s ratification a decade later, during 
Reconstruction’s collapse in the 1870s, and especially in the early Progressive years, merely recapitulate 
those patterns: ascriptive Americanism is powerfully challenged by forces of reform, and then 
decisively reinforced in law and custom––often under the auspices of liberal or republican principles.80  
 
Trump’s Ascriptive Nationalism  
Ascriptive Americanists today, as they always have, thus make claims––some implicit, some 
comprehensive––about who may be counted among the members of the political community and 
what rights or privileges they are entitled to by virtue of that membership.81 Prior to his official 
candidacy, throughout the 2016 presidential campaign, and repeatedly since taking office, Donald 
Trump’s signal rhetoric and policies have fit squarely in this political tradition. To see this is not 
difficult. Consider the widely reported utterances and policies that most cohere around the themes 
mentioned above: immigration, race, and anti-globalism.  
As early as 2010, Trump began to publicly (and erroneously) claim that Barack Obama, the first 
African-American president, was not born in the United States and that his election––and by extension 
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his administration––was illegitimate.82 A slew of conspiracy theorists, federal and state law makers, and 
other commentators, consistently denied or questioned Obama’s citizenship (and some still do).83 
Trump’s role in the entire “Birther” controversy indicates an instinctual grasp of the closely guarded 
sense of ethnonational identity long cultivated by white political leaders throughout the ascriptive 
tradition.84 In one analyst’s helpful formulation: “Obama was not merely black but also a foreigner, not 
just black and foreign but also a secret Muslim. Birtherism was not simply racism, but nationalism—a 
statement of values and a definition of who belongs in America.”85 Appealing to fears of immigrants 
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and Mexicans during his campaign announcement speech in New York, Trump famously averred that: 
“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you...They’re 
sending people that have lots of problems and they’re bringing those problems with us [sic]. They’re 
bringing drugs, they’re bringing crime, they’re rapists…”86  
The candidate’s early promise to erect a wall along the country’s southern border (“a great, 
great wall”) would become a centerpiece of the campaign, and two years later, of budgetary fights with 
Congress over the construction of new border fencing.87 One Rose Garden speech echoed the early 
rhetoric’s demonization of Mexican immigrants as criminals and degenerates: “We’re going to confront 
the national security crisis on our southern border, and we’re going to do it one way or the other…It’s 
an invasion…We have an invasion of drugs and criminals coming into our country.”88 Similar examples 
range from over seven-hundred tweets focused on the southern border and migrant “invasions,” to 
unscripted remarks at periodic (pre-re-election campaign) rallies.89 In the final days before the 2018 
midterm elections, Trump even deployed more than 5,000 active-duty military troops to the U.S.-
Mexico border, across three states, on the pretense of stopping the migrant “caravan,” warning––
without evidence90––that “Criminals and unknown Middle Easterners” were “mixed in” with the 
 
86    Text of Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech, Time. June 16th, 2016. https://time.com/3923128/donald-
trump-announcement-speech/. Hereafter cited as “Campaign Announcement Speech”. 
87      The most dramatic of these standoffs lead Trump to orchestrate the longest governmental shutdown in U.S. history, which I 
discuss in detail in the subsequent chapter. See Nicholas Fandos, Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Peter Baker, “Trump Signs Bill 
Reopening Government for 3 Weeks in Surprise Retreat From Wall.” New York Times. January 25th, 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/us/politics/trump-
shutdowndeal.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage. 
88      Aaron Blake, “Trump’s national emergency press conference, annotated,” The Washington Post, February 15th, 2019. Hereafter 
cited as “National Emergency Declaration”. 
89   Kirk Semple, “What Is the Migrant Caravan and Why Does Trump Care?” New York Times. October 18th, 2018. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/world/americas/trump-migrant-caravan.html?module=inline. Donald Trump. Twitter 
Posts. November 18, 2018, 1:42pm. https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1064227483187318784?s=20; June 24, 2018, 
11:02am. https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1010900865602019329?s=200; October 29, 2018, 10:41am. 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1056919064906469376?s=200. https://factba.se/topic/twitter?q=border&f=. 
90      Michael D. Shear and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Trump Sending 5,200 Troops to the Border in an Election-Season Response 
to Migrants.” New York Times. October 29th, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/29/us/politics/border-security-troops-
trump.html. 
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migrants.91  
This theme––the demonization of immigrants and racial or ethnic minorities––has been 
deployed and elaborated repeatedly over the course of Trump’s first term. It has also played a 
corresponding role in the administration’s immigration regime, especially in policies that have either 
targeted, or adversely affected, Muslims, Mexicans, and South and Central Americans. Executive Order 
13769, the first iteration of the so-called “Muslim ban” (or “travel ban”) as well as the policy of 
separating migrant children from families seeking asylum at the southern border , are the most overt 
examples.92 In her dissent in Trump v. Hawaii––the ruling that upheld the third iteration of the ban––
Justice Sonya Sotomayor cited some of Trump’s characteristic tweets at length, one of which justifies 
discrimination against Muslims explicitly: “That’s right, we need a TRAVEL BAN for certain 
DANGEROUS countries, not some politically correct term that won’t help us protect our people!”93 
These policies have met with mounting legal challenges in light of numerous federal rule violations and 
human rights abuses.94  
Trump’s Inaugural Address, as well as later speeches to the United Nations General Assembly, 
merely integrate the themes of race and immigration I’ve sketched with anti-globalism. In one 
characteristic speech, Trump performs this integration with a mix of economic and political diagnoses, 
 
91      Donald Trump. Twitter Post. October 22, 2018, 8:37am, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/10543510783288 
85248?s=200. 
92    “Executive Order 13769 of January 27, 2017, Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States,” 
Code of Federal Regulations, title 3 (2017): 8977-8982, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/02/01/2017-
02281/protecting-the-nation-from-foreign-terrorist-entry-into-the-united-states. 
93   Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965, 585 U.S. ___ (2018). In her dissent, Sotomayor writes that the Court’s ruling “…leaves 
undisturbed a policy first advertised openly and unequivocally as a ‘total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United 
States’ [quoting Trump] because the policy now masquerades behind a façade of national-security concerns…[and] The majority 
holds otherwise by ignoring the facts, misconstruing our legal precedent, and turning a blind eye to the pain and suffering the 
Proclamation inflicts upon countless families and individuals, many of whom are United States citizens.”  
94    Trump’s Department of Homeland Security (DHS) refused public acknowledgement of widely reported instances of child-
separation and neglect until June of 2018, finally disclosing––after mounting public outcries––that officials had “separated nearly 
2,000 children from their parents or legal guardians between April 19 and May 31.” See Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), 
Family Separation Under the Trump Administration––A Timeline. September 24, 2019. 
https://www.splcenter.org/news/2019/09/24/family-separation-under-trump-administration-timeline. 
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the nationalist prescriptions for which are to be found in the president’s governing “vision” offered in 
the Inaugural––“America First.” 95  
Defending the role of “national foundations” in the “free world,” Trump makes the case to the 
UN Assembly that a multicultural pluralism between nations––and, implicitly, within them––is a 
corrosive threat to national identity, to Americanism itself. “Each of you,” he claims, “has the absolute 
right to protect your borders. And so, of course, does our country…The free world must embrace its 
national foundations. It must not attempt to erase them or replace them…The future does not belong 
to globalists…the future belongs to patriots.”96 In the speech’s crescendo, Trump’s language channels, 
with remarkable clarity, earlier ascriptive appeals to a racially homogenous (presumably Anglo-Saxon) 
conception of American identity––complete with invocations of “culture,” “history,” and threats from 
“uncontrolled migration.”97 America First understood as the president has presented it––as a 
governing “political vision”––is less a principle designed to regulate foreign and domestic policy in 
adherence to anti-globalism, and more a definitionally exclusionary form of nationalism. America First 
is ascriptive nationalism. 
 
Presidential Demagoguery as Method: Political Synthesis 
What the rhetoric and policy I have sampled here share is an ideological hallmark of their 
common ascriptive heritage. This is the underlying notion that non-white “outsiders” (be they legal 
citizens or otherwise) are at minimum a threat to national security––and a defined ethnonational 
identity––and at maximum, subhuman, and thus not entitled to the protections of the law.98 Critics of 
 
95     Ibid., Inaugural Address (2016). 
96     Remarks by President Donald Trump to the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Delivered September 25, 
2019, in New York, NY. Text available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-74th-
session-united-nations-general-assembly/. Hereafter cited as “UN Speech”. See also, ibid., Cole and Shulman (2018) on Trump’s 
break with Republican orthodoxy on the NATO alliance, at 343.  
97      Ibid., UN Speech. 
98    See generally ibid., Smith (1997), 243-285, 347-409, especially his thematic case law Index at 672-699. See also “Executive 
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Trump often lament his rhetoric (and its policy corollaries) as the corrosion of presidential norms 
against demagoguery native to the founders’ Old Way.99 But in doing so, they fail to see how the 
vulgarized objects of that lament reflect, rather than corrode, the defining features of the modern 
institution forged by Wilson. Those features are independent of Trump, or any other politician, since 
any president is simultaneously capable of demagoguery and expected to negotiate leadership in 
Wilsonian terms, i.e., as a leader-interpreter. The ascriptive appeals catalogued above merely expose 
empirically the pathological potential Wilson’s leadership teaching has always necessarily contained. 
Trump demonstrates the ease with which the competing, pre-Wilson, sources of constraint can be 
jettisoned, and the office administered as a vehicle for unmitigated presidential demagoguery.  
Consider, for example, how Trump’s rhetoric around race, immigration, and anti-globalism 
satisfies the “four rules” of demagogic leadership described by Tulis: (1) Trump’s refrains about 
“political correctness,” “corrupt” elites in the media (and both parties), a “rigged” system, and the 
unprecedented numbers of conspiratorial claims he proffers, all imply a “concern for the common 
people as opposed to the elites.”100 (2) As his tweets, speeches, and outsized media coverage indicates, 
Trump’s “politics depends on a powerful, visceral connection with his supporters” that appears to 
“dramatically transcend ordinary political popularity.”101 (3) Trump’s incessant Twitter usage in 
particular, in tandem with the steadfast support by his electoral base indicated in polling, illustrates his 
 
Order 13841 of June 20, 2018, Affording Congress an Opportunity To Address Family Separation,” Code of Federal Regulations, 
title 3 (2018): 29435-29436, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/affording-congress-opportunity-address-family-
separation/. 
99    Paul Steinhauser, “Conservative Bill Kristol Brings His Never-Trump Message To New Hampshire,” CBS News. May 23, 
2018; E.J. Dionne, “What unites Trump’s apologists? Minority rule, Washington Post. November 24th, 2019. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-unites-trumps-apologists-minority-rule/2019/11/24/152c5d06-0d6c-11ea-
97ac-a7ccc8dd1ebc_story.html. 
100     On the new conspiracism Trump reflects and emboldens, see Nancy L. Rosenblum and Russell Muirhead’s brilliant new 
book, A Lot of People Are Saying: The New Conspiracism and the Assault on Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019). 
101     This is not to say that Trump or the policies I note are popular nationally––polling indicates the opposite scenario. Trump’s 
steadfast popularity within his base, in this account of demagoguery, is “transcendent” in the sense that nothing Trump has done 
or said has altered that numerical minority’s loyalties and support.  
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ability to “manipulate this connection, and the raging popularity it affords him” with a minority 
faction.102 (4) Finally, if anything is clear about Trump’s approach to governance, it is his willingness to 
“threaten or outright break established rules of conduct, institutions, and even the law.”103  
But Trump is more than the variety of demagogue thought unlikely by Wilson, and feared by 
the founders and Roosevelt. The way in which the themes of race, immigration, and anti-globalism 
course through his policy and rhetoric104 also represent what is most fundamental in Trump’s 
governing “vision”––they are elemental to the process of converging patterns of order his rhetorical 
approach signifies, the very ideological content needed to define and realize the “leadership” impulse. 
Trump has instinctively brought these two entrenched patterns in American politics together in a 
manner unseen in the modern era.105  
 
102     Tulis shows that although emergent mass communication tools like radio, television (and more recently, social media) have 
certainly supplied better technological capacity to presidents, it is Wilson’s new leadership doctrine––not communicational means 
per se––that legitimate presidential use of new media. Trump’s prolific Twitter feed confirms that pattern. On the wholly 
unprecedented volume of popular appeals made by Trump, see the empirical data and analysis in this recent project: Michael D. 
Shear, Maggie Haberman, Nicholas Confessore, Karen Yourish, Larry Buchana, and Keith Collins, “How Trump Reshaped the 
Presidency in Over 11,000 Tweets.” New York Times. November 2nd, 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/02/us/politics/trump-twitter-presidency.html. Hereafter “New York Times 
study.” 
103    See ibid, Tulis (2017), 204; ibid., Singer. Trump has seen mounting legal challenges on a variety of fronts during his first 
term––personal and official––but it is unclear whether or what legal charges might be (or have been) filed beyond his recent 
impeachment in the House for his actions in Ukraine. Trump was acquitted in the Senate. The historic impeachment trial was on-
going during the composition of this study’s second draft, but as of this (final) writing, Trump also faces multiple instances of 
pending litigation related to his tax records, as well as federal charges linked to Trump University in New York State. 
104   David A. Graham, Adrienne Green, Cullen Murphy, and Parker Richards, “An Oral History of Trump’s Bigotry,” The 
Atlantic. June 2019 Issue; Bernard E. Harcourt, “How Trump Fuels the Fascist Right,” The New York Review of Books. November 
29, 2018 Issue. 
105     The only analog for the demagoguery, and frequency of rhetoric, proffered by Trump is Andrew Johnson––who Tulis calls 
the “great exception” to the nineteenth-century doctrine’s influence. In the wake of Lincoln’s assassination, Johnson deployed 
incendiary personal attacks against political opponents, threatened violence against his partisan critics, used the power of his office 
to block Reconstruction reforms, and compared himself to Jesus Christ––along with a host of other highly scandalous actions––
before being impeached (and then acquitted in the Senate by one vote). Of course, many presidents have held (and overtly 
expressed) ascriptive or racist views, and either endorsed or failed to challenge racist policies. But the problem is that either these 
were during the pre-Wilson era, before popular leadership came to predominate, or because the Old Way actually did consistently 
hold sway over their conduct––as with presidents Richard Nixon, or Wilson, for instance. Both Wilson and Nixon are widely 
known to have been white supremacists, and Wilson was an open segregationist and Confederate apologist. However, explicit 
expressions of white supremacy as an animating principle or core policy aim––as opposed to one component or outcome of 
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Finally, what many analysts of Trump have overlooked about his signal rhetoric is not only 
how the form of its delivery constitutes the political apotheosis of the rhetorical presidency––the core 
principles of the New Way taken to their logical extreme. But also, how naturally that speech’s content, 
the ideological claims germane to ascriptive Americanism, map onto or comport with Wilson’s 
interpretive logic. Trump’s overt ascriptive appeals illustrate that the need to exclude and dominate 
marginalized groups inherent to the nativist, racist, and ethnocentric demonologies proffered by 
ascriptive nationalists, shares an underlying grammatical structure with hard demagoguery by definition; 
and therefore, with the messianic principle at the heart of Wilson’s teaching. Trump’s synthesis of 
ascriptive nationalism and the paradigmatic Wilsonian impulse recasts the modern presidency itself as 
the kind of institutional vehicle precisely calibrated for civic exclusions, social divisions, and the 
demagogic appeals to inegalitarian hierarchy typified in the ascriptive tradition.  
The only truly “novel” dimension of Trump’s presidency, then, might be this instinctive fusion 
of these long-standing patterns by virtue of their underlying logical compatibility. That demagoguery is 
dangerous when wedded to the most powerful reservoir of executive power in the world is not a new 
notion––or an entirely unprecedented occurrence––as Tulis’s account reminds us.106 That demagogic 
“leadership” represents, on the other hand, the ends and the means of presidential power, is another 
matter entirely. Trump’s innovation is that presidential demagoguery understood as a species of 
interpretation becomes, under his adaptation, not simply one mode of deploying prerogative power for 
governing purposes––for promoting or defending policy tied to ascriptive nationalism or other 
political projects––but the whole of executive power, an object in itself.  
* * * * 
 
 
imperial or domestic policy––were not fundamental to their presidencies as such, or to the signal features of their policy priorities. 
On Wilson’s racism and southern roots, see Stephen Skowronek, “The Reassociation of Ideas and Purposes: Racism, Liberalism, 
and the American Political Tradition,” American Political Science Review 100, no. 3 (2006): 385-401. 
106     Ibid., Tulis (1987), 87-95 (on Andrew Johnson). 
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CHAPTER 2: 
Symptoms of Constitutional Decay  
 
The true good of a nation can only be pursued by those who love it: by citizens who are 
rooted in its history, who are nourished by its culture…and who know that its future is 
theirs to build or theirs to lose. 
   - Donald Trump, 2019 
 
The effects of the scenario described in the foregoing chapter pose a problem for the political 
system. Not because Trump’s demagogic appeals or ascriptive policy “arguments” are novel: as I have 
stressed, Trump’s only innovation has been to fully synthesize patterns of continuity long predominant 
in the polity. Nor because, as the conventional wisdom107 would have it, Trump’s demagoguery and its 
policy corollaries auger an authoritarian collapse of the political order, or even brazen abuses of 
executive power.108 Although Trump may talk like an “authoritarian,” he has consistently failed to 
marshal the formal powers of his office for authoritarian ends, his embattled immigration policies not 
excepted.109  
Instead, Trump’s new synthesis of old elements is a problem because it constitutes the 
effective redefinition of presidential power as pure Wilsonian interpretation––a proliferation of 
unmitigated demagoguery that constitutes the de facto eclipse of the Old Way, a symbol of that 
doctrine’s impotence (or irrelevance) in the Trump regime.110 The key question in Trump’s case, then, 
is what the material consequences of that demagogic rhetoric are in the polity. Does that particular 
mode of communication––supposing it does issue from, and fuse, the antecedents I’ve traced––
 
107      Ibid., Snyder (2017). 
108      To be sure, specific abuses of the powers of Trump’s office have taken place during the first term––the conduct leading to 
his impeachment is the most important of these. But that conduct was markedly not brazen––it was a secret scheme. 
Authoritarians don’t care about cover-ups.  
109    See generally Corey Robin, The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Donald Trump, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2018); and “The Politics Trump Makes,” N+1 Magazine. January 11, 2017. https://nplusonemag.com/online-
only/online-only/the-politics-trump-makes/. 
110      Christopher J. Putney, “The Metapolitics of Illiberalism and the Alt-Right: Intellectual Origins and Constitutional Decay.” 
Paper given at the Annual American Political Science Association Meeting, Washington, D.C., August 31st, 2019. 
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amount to anything more than a presidential aesthetic for citizens to praise or lament? Trump’s 
exacerbation of several governance dilemmas suggests it does.  
 
Dilemmas of Decay 
Trump’s case illustrates that presidential demagoguery constitutes more than a mode of 
communication. It is also a mode––for him, the only mode––of governing. Although ascriptive 
nationalism and Wilson’s New Way have coexisted in American politics across the last century in ways 
largely “independent” of each other, they are the essence of Trump’s presidency because their synthesis 
constitutes his only conception of governance: “Life is a campaign. Make America Great Again is a 
campaign. For me, [the presidency] is a campaign.”111 That conception––widely noted by Trump’s 
critics––has been chalked up to the eccentricities of Trump’s personality, but little understood.112 At 
the deepest level, it evidences that the century-old ingredients of demagogic pathology embedded in 
Wilson’s doctrine have been unleashed under the auspices of Trump’s nationalism, and hence, that the 
office itself operates today as an accelerant of constitutional decay.  
The forms of dysfunction that attest to that acceleration––what I call governance by campaign 
and the failure of separation of powers––are mutually reinforcing, and both systemic in nature. They 
materially affect core functions of the political system itself, i.e., those features prefigured in the 
constitutional design understood as an architectonic structure.113 To the extent that those pre-existing 
 
111   Lindsey Bever, “ ‘Demonic Activity was Palpable’ at Trump’s rally, Pastor says,” Washington Post, February 22, 2017. “One 
advisor calls political rallies the president’s ‘oxygen.’” https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-
faith/wp/2017/02/22/demonic-a ctivity-palpable-at-president-trumps-rally-pastor-says/?tid=sm_fb&utm_term=.e09 de89c9308 
(accessed February 25, 2017). 
112    Lauren Katz, “Trump rallies aren’t a sideshow—they’re his entire campaign,” VOX, November 6th, 2019.  
113    For a rich account of the founding design, see ibid., Tulis (1987), 25-87. For an account of how the constitutive “instruments 
and institutions” of the Constitution itself have been used for the purposes of systematic oppression and illiberal governance 
regimes, see Corey Robin, “Fragmented State, Pluralist Society: How Liberal Institutions Promote Fear,” in Missouri Law Review, 
vol. 69 (May 2006), 1062-1093; Fear: The History of a Political Idea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); and “American 
Institutions Won’t Keep Us Safe from Donald Trump’s Excesses,” The Guardian. February 02, 2017. 
  29 
problems are enhanced by Trump’s conduct as president, his case should be understood as hastening, 
but not engendering, them (as many analysts have implied).114 I develop the concept of constitutional 
decay here to explain these infirmities, but it was anticipated thirty years ago in The Rhetorical 
Presidency.115 
In several case studies of governance crises linked to Wilson’s project, Tulis traces the contours 
of a number of systemic “dilemmas” caused or compounded by the ambivalence of the modern 
presidency I noted earlier: the underlying tension between the Old and New Ways that has (at least 
until Trump) reliably structured presidential behavior.116 In these cases he underscores numerous 
institutional trends, but his discussions of presidential speech, the role of mass media in popular policy 
appeals, and modern White House communications operations are the most instructive for our 
purposes. These insights supply the basics of a framework for explaining the contemporary forms of 
constitutional decay exacerbated by Trump.117  
The first is the increasingly effaced distinction between political campaigns and the 
administration of government during the last half-century or so, for which scholars still offer countless 
and contradictory explanations.118 Without wading into that on-going debate, Tulis details the 
ubiquitous manner in which perceived Wilsonian leadership imperatives have come to predominate the 
 
114     See, for example, authors listed in n2 above. 
115    Ibid., Tulis (1987), 137, 145, 173-205. Tulis has used the term “constitutional decay” in several places, very broadly, but has 
resisted developing the subject further in a systematic way. There has been a flood in recent years––especially since Trump’s 
election––of works by legal scholars, political scientists, and journalists interested in the broadly related themes of constitutional 
dysfunction or “rot,” regime “decay,” democratic “retrogression,” and constitutional “crisis.” The most important of these are 
works by Jack Balkin, John Finn, Sandford Levinson, Bruce Ackerman, and Keith Whittington. Balkin’s concept of 
“constitutional rot” has several overlapping areas of concern with what I take to be, following Tulis, evidence of systemic 
maladies in American politics, but there are several key differences between his broader view and my focus on the presidency in 
the constitutional order. Because of constraints of space I don’t explore those here. See generally Jack Balkin and Sanford 
Levinson, Democracy and Dysfunction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018). 
116   Ibid., Tulis, 173. He observes that: “The development of the rhetorical presidency does not appear to be an unqualified 
blessing as most scholars, citizens, and politicians assume, but rather a political development whose enormous political promise 
has been accompanied by considerable systemic costs.” See idem., 12-13, 173-202.  
117     Ibid., 161-172, 189. See generally ch. 7, at 205. 
118     Ibid., Tulis and Muirhead (forthcoming).  
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crafting of presidential speech––“popular” or otherwise––as well as national policy debate. Even more 
detrimentally, he shows the manner in which presidential rhetoric actually structures the 
conceptualization and production of policy itself in the post-Wilson polity.119 In this scenario, within 
and outside of Congress and the executive branch, policy “slogans” shape the conception and 
production of law, instead of legislative substance or the merits of competing policy approaches. 
Increasingly ambitious legislative reforms (e.g., the New Deal, the War on Poverty, Obamacare) are 
constructed  in complex packages––in LBJ’s case, with remarkable rapidity––in ways that incorporate, 
or are, quite literally, policy versions of presidential metaphors and campaign rhetoric.120  
As partisan regimes ascend and decay, these legislative packages are discarded or adopted 
wholesale, without substantive deliberation over modifications or experimentation with past or present 
policy alternatives. This cycle on repeat, Tulis shows, erodes “the processes of deliberation” Congress 
was designed to impel, as well as subsequent reform efforts.121 The churn of the modern news cycle, in 
addition to the competing rhetorical appeals made by other institutional actors (e.g., senators), in turn 
generate “fictive worlds” that are recreated as “constitutive features” of “real” politics.122 The 
development of institutionalized speechwriting (and other communications) staff, pollsters, and 
campaign consultants in the White House during the postwar years––and the senior policy roles 
increasingly filled by those staffers––is a symptom of those trends.123  
With the “decay of deliberation in government” aggravated by these practices, Tulis writes, the 
 
119       Ibid., Tulis., 161, 174-181. 
120       Ibid., 161-189. See especially Johnson’s War on Poverty case at 161. 
121       Ibid., 161-189. 
122    On political “spectacles” generally, see Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1988). On spectacles and symbolism as it relates to problem definition and policy development, see Frank R. Baumgartner, 
and Bryan D. Jones, “Agenda dynamics and policy subsystems,” The Journal of Politics 53, no. 4 (1991): 1044-1074; Deborah A. 
Stone, “Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas,” Political Science Quarterly 104, no. 2 (1989): 281-300; Roger W. Cobb, 
and David A. Rochefort, The Politics of Problem Definition: Shaping the Policy Agenda (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), and 
John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984).   
123    Tulis, 186, n.20. In “reinforcing the fictive qualities of presidential speech,” Tulis observes, “this institution of experts 
exercises a subtle but considerable influence upon how a president thinks about politics––upon the presidential mind.” 
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“officers of our major political branches speak past one another to a vast amorphous constituency.”124 
These dynamics, taken together, end up obscuring the complex nature and salience of “real” issues, 
and constraining legislative debate in ways that yield long-term governance problems.125 In turn, the 
incentives and expectations for popular policy appeals––for national policy itself––routinize “crisis 
politics,” and distort the very purposes and outcomes of lawmaking.126 He explains: 
…the more the rhetorical presidency succeeds as a strategy in the short term, the more likely 
it is that deliberative processes will be eroded…It is increasingly the case that presidential 
speeches themselves [including, today at least, tweets] have become the issues and events of 
modern politics rather than the medium through which issues and events are discussed and 
assessed…When speech is designed to appeal to public opinion, especially in oral, visible 
performance, the effect upon political discourse is more troublesome than a transient arousal 
of passion in the demos. More significantly, the terms of discourse that structure subsequent 
“sober” discussion of policy are altered, reshaping the political world in which that policy 
and future policy is understood and implemented. By changing the meaning of policy, 
rhetoric alters policy itself and the meaning of politics in the future.127 
 
Returning to the themes of immigration, race, and anti-globalism in Trump’s case, we find 
these earlier trends enhanced and compounded. One useful vantage point onto these dilemmas is the 
border wall controversy that began with Trump’s demonization of Mexicans and immigrants at the 
outset of his campaign. A shallow interpretation of the challenges linked to constructing new fencing 
along the U.S.-Mexico border that have punctuated Trump’s first term would suggest standard fiscal 
and political explanations.128 But “The Wall,” understood as policy-metaphor, actually bears out the 
deeper problem and effects––namely, how the concept functions as much more than mere campaign 
demagoguery. It also supplies Trump the underlying logic, the very conceptual vocabulary, of his 
 
124    It is difficult to overstate how much this picture contrasts with earlier Congresses, especially those from the first 
half-century following Ratification. See ibid., Tulis (2003), 200, 206. 
125    One robust example is the numerous implementation failures, and adverse effects, of War on Poverty policies shaped at their 
basic levels by the war metaphor. See ibid., Tulis (1987), 161-189. 
126    Ibid., 174-181.  
127    Ibid., 178-179, n.8. 
128    Ibid., Blake, “Trump’s national emergency press conference.” 
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governance process in this instance.  
The Wall is a symbolic nexus of ascriptive themes and their policy corollaries––akin to 
Trump’s Birtherism. Just as Birtherism implied a set of interconnected racist, Islamophobic, and anti-
immigrant discourses, well-constructed––i.e., resonant––policy-metaphors like The Wall distill a 
complicated set of messages into a form suited to popular appeals: Trump tweeted, as of late 2019, 
1,159 times about immigration understood through the border wall lens.129 Moreover, instead of 
marshalling widespread support among voters and lawmakers of both parties for comprehensive 
immigration reform––only one facet of which would be the southern border––once in office, Trump 
elaborated the ascriptive, crisis rhetoric of the campaign in ways that actually literalized those themes in 
policy terms. After vetoing a bipartisan spending bill that rejected Trump’s request for increased 
funding for the “great, great wall” devised in the campaign, he orchestrated the longest governmental 
shutdown in U.S. history in hopes of pressuring Democrats (and Republicans) in Congress to 
reconsider the measure in terms he found preferable.130 Doubling down on his earlier claims that there 
was “a national security crisis on our southern border,” “an invasion of drugs and criminals coming into 
our country,” Trump formally declared a “national emergency” at the border. The emergency 
declaration was designed to justify the reallocation of $3.6 billion, originally appropriated for unrelated 
military spending, to wall construction.131  
Consider the conventional reading of this sequence of events from the point of view devised 
 
129     Ibid., New York Times Study. Most of the American politics literature dealing with “framing” issues treats those processes 
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political entrepreneurs and the preexisting institutional orders in which they operate as the key independent variables shaping all 
political change,” including issue frames. 
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first by Wilson, in his redefinition of presidential purpose, and unwittingly reiterated in influential 
works by later scholars like Richard Neustadt and Stephen Skowronek.132 Looking at the border 
controversy from “over the president’s shoulder”––“out and down” from the leader’s viewpoint (in 
Neustadt’s formulation)––the president sought to overcome the structural obstacles put in his place by 
“separate institutions sharing power.”133 He made sustained popular policy appeals, both during the 
campaign and well into the governing phase, interpreting what he took to be the deeper “purpose” and 
“need” of the people––the source of his “strength” and “authority” in the Wilsonian view. Ascriptive 
Americanism, in defining the ideological and general policy content of those needs, also defined “the 
people”––those who Trump, in the emergency declaration speech, called “the real country…the people 
that really love our country.”134 And in instinctively seeking to exploit the disruptive political 
possibilities afforded him by his particular place in the cyclical authority structures written into 
“political time,” Trump used the prerogatives at his disposal like all presidents do: he sought to push 
back against the political, institutional, and other constraints supplied by the particular historical 
context he found himself in.135 He issued a veto, “went public” with demagogic appeals, sought to 
bargain with or pressure partisans in Congress and the executive branch, and ultimately used the 
unilateral emergency declaration that executive discretion supplies. 
The problem with that version of events is its premises. In taking for granted the institutionally 
“partisan” perspective Neustadt developed following (however unwittingly) Wilson’s modern 
leadership model––wherein “success” in policy is conflated with success for the polity itself––it 
obscures the effects of the underlying pathology exploited by presidential demagogues. Governance by 
 
132      Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership with Reflections on Johnson and Nixon. (New York: John Wiley, 
1976, orig. pub. 1960). As Tulis has aptly noted: “Neustadt’s influence is evidenced by our own inclination to think about the 
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writing about the presidency today is done under the auspices of a perspective invented by Neustadt, and all presidents since 
Kennedy have been held to Neustadt’s standards.” See ibid., Tulis (2000), 265-73 and ibid., Skowronek (2003). 
133       Ibid., Neustadt (1976), preface, 43, 179, 35, 183. 
134       Ibid., Blake, “Trump’s national emergency press conference.” 
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campaign, and its consequences for the separation of powers, are misconstrued as marks of business-
as-usual instead of as evidence of constitutional decay. A systemic point of view, i.e., a view from the 
perspective of the polity’s multiple and often conflicting principles of governance––robust legislative 
deliberation, intelligent national debate, and productive institutional contestation in this case––supplies 
a very different version of events.136 
 The president’s wall rhetoric, in proffering a demonstrably fabricated “crisis” that implies 
resources requisite to a “national emergency,” actually replicates the campaign’s “invasion” narrative 
surrounding the border––ascriptive appeals included––within the process of governance. Just as (for 
Trump) the 2016 campaign never really ended, neither did the core national crisis against which he 
wielded the racialized ideological grammar of America First. In the campaign, Trump’s critiques of 
“globalism,” immigration, and minorities were shorthand for the story long recycled by ascriptive 
Americanists: that non-white immigrants were invading, and endangering, traditional American 
“identity,” “culture,” or other euphemisms for inegalitarian hierarchy and white supremacy. The Wall, 
in that story, served as a symbol of the problem and the solution––a demagogic tool for marshalling 
electoral support. Critics of that campaign narrative (or at least its paragon) were complicit, it was 
suggested, in abetting the “invasion,” and Trump’s election held up as a messianic aversion of disaster 
(e.g., “I alone can fix it”). If that crisis narrative arch seems familiar as the stuff of normal presidential 
politics––even in less demagogic forms––it is because, as Wilson intended, it has become the standard 
template. The features of the modern selection system and new mass communications technologies 
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like the Internet and social media have merely enhanced or further regularized that standard.137  
In the governing phase, however, these very categories––the campaign’s central themes––are 
reproduced as the features of Trump’s conception and administration of policy, the substance and 
operating logic of presidential leadership in practice. Understood in this light, Trump’s on-going 
“rallies”––which did not cease following his inauguration––take on a whole new significance. The Wall 
still functions as a symbol of immigrants-as-threat, and as the only measure befitting the “crisis” at 
hand. Congressional lawmakers uninterested in the construction of a massive border wall are again 
made synonymous with the immigrant enemy––and thus complicit in the “invasion of drugs and 
criminals” (“They [lawmakers] say walls don’t work. Walls work 100 percent.”).138 But the critical 
difference in the governing narrative, obviously, is that if The Wall metaphor was powerful enough to 
impel voters to support Trump’s ultimate election––the realization of the campaign’s definitional goal–
–it was not enough to translate the policy-metaphor into a real-life barrier of the size and scope Trump 
had regaled his supporters with throughout the campaign. Just as with the Muslim ban, Trump had to 
resort to unilateral measures like executive orders to cut through institutional intransigence and 
“pursue” the ascriptive-nationalist agenda his candidacy defined.  
Yet if that disjunction between campaigning and governing, between political fantasy and 
administrative fact, proves Trump’s “weakness” as an “aspirational fascist” or Wilsonian leader-
interpreter––by both measures, it does––the border controversy does not imply that his attempts to 
translate campaign forms into the objects of executive power are impotent. These have real 
consequences for the political system itself. Trump’s unmitigated demagoguery accelerates 
constitutional decay because the polity’s core institutional features, which are reflected in the 
separation of powers scheme, presuppose conditions that permit the operation of its political logic in 
practice. Legislative deliberation and a dynamic agonism within and between federal branches are those 
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conditions, and they reflect the same principles of regime design we saw earlier in Wilson’s critique of 
the framers.  
* * * * 
To glimpse the exacerbated degeneration of policy discourse (i.e., deliberation on policy merit) 
in Trump’s case is to perceive deepening institutional imbecility in American politics. Consider the 
issue of deliberation in lawmaking in the context of the Old Way’s theory of separation of powers. 
Contrary to an overly legalistic view popularized by legal scholars and judges over the last century, the 
theory of separation of powers delineated in Federalist 47-51 is actually a sly revision of Montesquieu’s 
“checks and balances” view of competing institutions.139 That revision is also considerably more 
sophisticated than what Montesquieu (or most constitutional lawyers) would probably permit.  
The 1787 framework provides a matrix of offices and structures institutionally “biased” 
towards serving their own public ends––governance goals that in theory accord with each branch’s 
distinctive institutional resources for public “goods.”140 But this architecture was not only configured 
to neutralize political contestation or “limit” federal power by cabining it––as circuits structure and 
control electricity, and as conservative jurists often emphasize––but also to induce a kind of institutional 
dynamism. In a word, to generate and exploit power in such a way as to make representation and 
effective governance workable on an untested continental scale.141 The corresponding public goals of 
these arrangements across branches are familiar: popular will, the protection of rights, national 
security, and legislative deliberation (among others). In Tulis’s useful formulation of the scheme’s 
political logic: “ordinary self-interest can be tied to institutional place and transformed into public-
regarding behavior, regardless of whether individual political motives are authentic or 
sincere…individual self-interest is translated into ambition, ambition into policy position, policy 
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position into policy argument, and in some important instances, policy argument into constitutional 
argument.” 142  
In this view, legislative deliberation could facilitate a process of collective reasoning among 
elites that Congress would be uniquely equipped to foster, even despite familiar “collective action” 
problems.143 By design, as we saw earlier, the presidency would have a central role to play in this 
process––both deliberatively, and, at a larger level, administratively––but Congress would be the nexus 
of issue-debate and policy production.144 Formal power, in the Madisonian dispensation, by the 
inducement of public-regarding behavior in ambitious legislative actors, would thus make 
representative democracy workable: the Constitution would solicit, absorb, and then structure, 
competing responses to public problems.  
Returning to Trump’s case, if the Old Way’s model of policy deliberation and institutional 
dynamism appears a total anachronism today, that appearance is a testament to the role of the modern 
presidency in merging the processes of governing and campaigning.145 Trump’s immigration 
demagoguery as president is a further devolution of those tendencies: the parlance of his racial and 
ethnic demonologies––terms like “invasion,” “crisis,” “emergency,” and “criminals”––obviously figure 
centrally in The Wall metaphor, just as they did throughout the campaign. But they also set the terms of 
debate among elites in Congress, and the nation more generally. They camouflage––and in so doing, 
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they erase––the real (and inherently contestable) regulatory and ethical questions implied by the 
problem of immigration reform itself, as well as modern policy production more generally.  
Were the terms of this demagogic approach muted, modified, or even absent in Trump’s 
rhetoric, Congress would likely be tasked by citizens with deliberating––even legislating––on the issue. 
Especially, it might be said, based on the pre-existing support for immigration reform in the wider 
public. But because the entire set of issues related to immigration––not only the southern border, or 
fence construction, or reform per se, but the entire legal genre of immigration policy––is distilled down 
to binary opposition or support for The Wall in elite discourse, alternative terms are effectively 
irrelevant. Trump’s frequent attacks that Democrats and earlier administrations are to blame for a 
“broken immigration system,” and even his invocations of the need for comprehensive “reform,” do 
not displace the primacy of The Wall metaphor. They simply work to reinforce it by virtue of the fact 
that he is the one speaking (or tweeting) on the topic––his past remarks, and by extension, the policy-
metaphor, are ever-present subtexts. Just like the similitudes of demagoguery and leadership-as-
interpretation, ascriptive Americanism and hard demagoguery, or campaigns and governance––
eventually, the terms of the policy-metaphor become indistinguishable from the issue, from a policy’s 
underlying and contestable purposes, and as we see here, from the policy itself. 









  39 
 
CONCLUSION 
There is no description for the scenario I have detailed in Trump’s case other than multiform 
systemic dysfunction. Highly imperfect in numerous respects, and nowhere close to devoid of 
“polarized” or bitter partisanship, earlier Congresses regularly responded to complex issues in ways 
that meaningfully challenged presidents’ authority, cooperated on heavily debated policy questions, and 
deployed their unique institutional tools within and between institutions in the pursuit of their goals.146  
Under the original theory of separation of powers, the combination of formal power and 
custom might have induced Trump––or members of Congress––to either establish or contest the 
principles capable of informing and guiding productive deliberation on the issues.147 It is not 
incomprehensible that Trump could have done this in a fashion similar to several recent presidents––
Bill Clinton or Barack Obama on healthcare policy, for instance. It is also plausible that Trump could 
have done so in ways that might have actually accorded with his own preferences or increased his 
political popularity (as a purported “deal-maker”). But campaigns do not reward protracted and 
vigorous deliberation on policy merits, and they rarely reward comity with opponents. That kind of 
calculus––the logic of governing that comes from thinking about the presidency as one salient piece in 
a larger whole––does not apply in a national “crisis.” Emergencies in today’s decaying constitutional 
order demand a single leader; a leader-interpreter. 
So if the central problem with classical demagoguery accepted in the founding model––the one 
articulated by Hamilton, et al. in the Federalist––was that it augured the consolidation of state power by 
a single faction, or regime collapse at the hands of a divisive autocrat, unrestrained presidential 
demagoguery today suggests another possibility. At least in Trump’s case, we have seen, it seems to 
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exacerbate forms of systemic imbecility in a manner that speaks to deeper dilemmas born of the 
system itself. In other words, if the synthesis of ascriptive nationalism and the modern presidency 
made manifest by Trump’s election accelerates these infirmities, it is because those problems were well 
under way in the operation of American politics: the conditions of constitutional decay that attend the 
predominance of the rhetorical presidency have long served as the quotidian substance of national 
governance in the polity. The core problem presented by the presidency today, then––at least based on 
that insight––might be two-fold.  
The first issue is the permanence of Wilson’s important efforts at innovation––the doctrinal 
ambivalence that undergirds the institution detailed in the first chapter. Despite Trump’s 
disinterestedness in the elements of the Old Way his critics often invoke against him, understood as an 
engine of governance dilemmas, that ambivalence still pre-dates Trump. And just like the Wilsonian 
teaching’s tendency to pathology, or the ascriptive tradition more generally, that ambivalence is a 
feature of American politics independent of Trump the man. After Trump’s presidency comes to a 
close, the “political hybrid” that Wilson’s reconstitution of the office amounted to may very well 
“revert” back to the uneasy tension between the Old and New Ways, and simply resume its tendency 
to structure modern leadership and its problems in familiar ways. But what would that scenario look 
like? Would it be any different because of the apotheosis of the Wilsonian impulse we have seen under 
Trump’s tenure? 
Presidents elected in the near future may have a much lower––or much higher, depending on 
one’s perspective––threshold for “success” according to standards tied to either dispensation, Old or 
New. Trump’s unpopularity outside of his base, after all, may powerfully incentivize a renewal of 
norms of constraint (or less rhetorical “leadership”) among Trump’s immediate successors. But it 
seems almost inconceivable that popular rhetoric and its effects couldn’t continue to play a central role 
in near-term presidencies, given the primacy of performativity and governance by campaign in 
contemporary politics. In other words, nothing about Trump’s case indicates that future presidents 
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won’t be “pulled and hauled” between the two theories of presidential purpose after he leaves office. 
More than likely, presidents in the years following Trump, in seeking to negotiate that enduring 
ambivalent environment, will continue to be defined by an institution and a polity that at once struggle 
to define themselves and each other. In a politics marred by the incoherence between a deracinated left 
and an empowered but delegitimized right, the leadership challenges of any future president look 
formidable, even beyond these underlying doctrinal conflicts.  
The second matter raised by Trump’s case is which features of regime design might themselves 
be contributing to constitutional decay. One starting point for this set of questions, based on my 
discussions of the founders’ constitutional theory, is obvious but nonetheless timely: were the twin 
presuppositions of the American separation of powers scheme––the reliability or expectation of 
institutional loyalty, and a modicum of engaged civic participation––fatal errors for the system writ large? 
It seems increasingly clear that today’s form of party loyalty (as well as ideological sorting between the 
two parties), although certainly not unprecedented, has subsumed the institutional partisanship Madison 
presumed would be durable enough to make that system’s “series of translations” work. Are the 
“interests of the man” really “connected to the constitutional rights of the place” anymore? 148 This 
seems doubtful. 
The functional issue of “parliamentary parties” in a separation of powers system is not new, 
but Trump’s case problematizes it further. With heightened expectations throughout the populace for 
concerted policy leadership by presidents and other actors, governance by campaign becomes more 
intractable, and more counterproductive. The incentives seem to shift from the “jealously guarded” 
prerogatives of a given institution––the Senator thinking of herself as a senator first, and a partisan 
second––to the demands of party orthodoxy and competing rhetorical imperatives. What I tried to 
underscore in Trump’s wall controversy is linked to one of Tulis’s earlier insights on this point: that 
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the standards of speech and discourse that have come to predominate in American politics have 
materially transformed much of day-to-day governing into a series of utterances––tweets, interviews, 
speeches, or other rhetorical events––which instead of serving as the medium for competing 
arguments, become (and later structure) the substance of politics and policy. The political logic at the 
core of separation of powers appears at best eroded, and at worst, inverted, by these interlocking 
dynamics. Put simply: contemporary partisanship and governance by campaign cause older institutional 
incentives to fail.  
As in the case of policy-metaphors like The Wall, they also further inhibit deliberation between 
engaged citizens and lawmakers, and between lawmakers and other officials: issues are obscured or 
defined incompletely, and policy’s merits are jettisoned for fictive campaigns. Governance by 
campaign––especially in Trump’s case––and the breakdown of separation of powers viewed in light of 
those corrosive effects, thus combine in ways that deeply de-politicize politics in the United States. 
This form of de-politicization, understood as a problem for democratic governance in liberal regimes, 
may be one of the ultimate––but perhaps logically necessary––products of modern liberalism itself. In 
other words, if the theory underlying modern representative forms developed by the framers––one 
rooted in the political anthropology delineated (though not uniformly) by Enlightenment theorists like 
Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu––sought to mitigate or transform the possibilities of power’s usage 
by circumscribing its legitimate purposes constitutionally, then the American case demonstrates the 
manifest limits of that modern architectonic theory; not only for resolving modern power’s conflictual 
imperatives (e.g., security vs. rights or positive law’s inherent ambiguities), but also for the inconsistent 
tendency of separation of powers to actually foster effective governance by its own standards.  
Finally, in this study, I have tried to show how independent patterns of continuity taken for 
granted in American politics can come together in subtle ways that actually affect systemic conditions. 
Affect, not reorder: saying that the capture of the presidency’s demagogic leadership capacity by an 
ascriptive nationalist has accelerated forms of constitutional decay is different from claiming that 
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Trump is a “proto-fascist” unrestrained by anyone or anything. The latter characterization, scholars 
have shown, overlooks the material weaknesses of the Republican regime, the national unpopularity of 
many of Trump’s policies, and the broader ideological incoherence among conservatives visible in his 
first term.149 But the larger arguments I have tried to make in reinterpreting Trump are an 
advertisement for how we might rethink the presidency’s place in American politics more generally, 
and in a more diagnostic fashion. For the relationships I have tried to discern in Trump’s 
contemporary case––between ascriptive nationalism, Wilsonian leadership, demagoguery, and 
constitutional decay––all evidence the need for more diagnosis. 
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